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Resumen 
Las organizaciones y redes autónomas de base constituyen la 
parte más dinámica y con un crecimiento más rápido del sector 
no gubernamental en China. Sin embargo, pocos estudios se 
han centrado en definir, categorizar y determinar las funciones 
sociopolíticas de estas pequeñas organizaciones. El presente 
estudio comienza a llenar este vacío: primero define y divide la 
variedad de grupos en cuatro categorías basándose en sus 
características organizativas y, después, trata la importancia de 
las organizaciones de base en la aparición de la sociedad civil 
en China.     
Palabras clave  
Sector no-gubernamental, organizaciones de base, sociedad 
civil, China.  
Abstract 
Grassroots and autonomous organizations and networks are the 
most vibrant and fastest growing part of China’s 
nongovernmental sector. Yet, few studies have focused on 
defining, categorizing, and determining the socio-political 
functions of these small organizations. The current study begins 
to fill this gap. It first defines and divides the diverse array of 
groups into four categories based on their organizational 
features, and then discusses the significance of grassroots 
organizations in the emergence of civil society in China.     
Keywords 
Non-governmental sector, grassroots organizations, civil 
society, China. 
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Ma Qiusha 
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Since the 1970s, the rise of civic organizations—the so-called 
associational revolution—has played a crucial role in the 
evolution of civil society around the world. Under strong 
international influence and in the aftermath of the 1978 reforms 
that created a market economy and diversified public/private 
interests and social life in China, new institutions and 
organizations outside the state system in China have blossomed 
and increased dramatically in number, size, and influence. 
These nongovernmental and nonprofit organizations (NGOs) 
have played an important role, especially since the mid-1990s, 
in the evolving civil society in China. Indeed, grassroots and 
autonomous organizations and networks are most vibrant and 
fastest growing part of China’s nongovernmental sector.  
The imperative change in China’s political landscape has 
attracted the attention of China scholars as well as NGO 
scholars, and their publications have helped us in our 
understanding of NGOs and civil society in China. Many 
important aspects of such a development remain to be explored, 
however. The great majority of publications on NGOs 
worldwide concern formally established and registered NGOs; 
                                                 
1 Publication of this paper has been authorised by CIDOB-Barcelona Centre 
for International Affairs. 
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in China a large proportion of this type of organization is 
governmentally organized NGOs (GONGOs). The small 
nonprofit organizations are typically omitted from sector 
accounts. For example, in the United States, prevailing 
economic theories in the nonprofit field direct attention to 
larger and more formal service-providing organizations. From 
an economic point of view, very small and informal 
organizations are of lesser importance. However, social capital 
and civil society arguments have focused renewed attention on 
informal, voluntaristic groups, many of which are likely small 
in scale and thus absent from existing data sources (Toepler, 
2003). Harvard political scientist Robert Putnam is the major 
scholar in this surge of interest in social capital and 
associational life. According to Putnam, informal associations 
alter people’s associational behavior because “taking part in a 
choral society or a bird-watching club can teach self-discipline 
and an appreciation for the joys of successful collaboration” 
(Putnam, 1993). Putnam and Kenneth Newton both believe that 
informal or grassroots organizations in some respects may well 
be a great deal more important than formal organizations 
(Newton, 1999). The last years has witnessed the rapid growth 
of grassroots organizations (GOs) in China, and this 
phenomenon reflects profound changes in the Chinese people’s 
social and associational behavior that make the study of GOs a 
meaningful topic. 
Grassroots organizations –vast, diverse, and fluid– present a 
considerable challenge to scholars in collecting data, 
categorizing, and assessing. The great majority of grassroots 
organizations are not in the official statistics; moreover, the 
Chinese government does not easily permit large-scale 
independent surveys on the subject, especially by foreign 
researchers.  To a large extent, the overall condition of GOs in 
China is still unknown. This study intends to shed light on these 
GOs, and it tries to provide basic information about the type, 
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mission, leadership, and attributes of those entities, and their 
roles in China’s transformation. The paper discusses this topic 
from three aspects: 1) a practical definition of grassroots 
organizations “compatible” with China’s current political 
situation and the organizations’ development, compared to 
popular ideas of grassroots organizations in the West; 2) a 
description of grassroots organizations in China and their 
contexts, based on initiative, mission, and organizational 
features; 3) a view of grassroots organizations in terms of social 
capital and the value of GOs from the participants’ point of 
view. 
Chinese Definition of Grassroots Organizations 
The word “grassroots” has appeared in political terminology 
since the early 20th century: grassroots movement, grassroots 
democracy, grassroots organizations, etc. Grassroots stands for 
the fundamental level of organization or community. In her 
study of grassroots movements and global civil society, Srilatha 
Batliwala explains that the concept of grassroots specifically 
means  
“the basic building blocks of society –small rural 
communities or urban neighborhoods where the ‘common 
men’ (or women) lived–. In some contexts it was used to 
signify the poor, labor or working class, as opposed to 
dominant social elites; in others, it was usually applied to 
rural, village-based communities rather than urban” 
(Batliwala, 2002).  
From this understanding, the terms “grassroots movement” and 
“grassroots organization” naturally convey the connotation of 
local, small, bottom-up initiatives.  
In his book Grassroots Organizations, David Smith defines 
these organizations as being  
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“locally based, significantly autonomous, volunteer-run, 
formal nonprofit groups that manifest substantial voluntary 
altruism as groups and use the associational form of 
organization and, thus, have official memberships of 
volunteers who perform most, and often all, of the 
work/activity done in and by these nonprofits” (Smith, 2000).  
Among the characteristics he lists, Smith particularly 
emphasizes the local association form in labeling nonprofits as 
grassroots organizations (Smith, 2000). Smith describes the 
state of GOs as a “dark matter,” because they exist in great 
numbers yet we fail to discern so many of them. He attributes 
this consequence to a flat-earth paradigm, which accounts only 
for the most visible, typically formally organized, voluntary 
efforts.  
The “grassroots organization” –caogen zuzhi （草根组织）– is 
an import concept in China, yet it has been adopted and 
interpreted by Chinese NGO activists and scholars in accord 
with the Chinese nonprofit sector’s specific situation. The 
earliest adoption of the term occurred in the late 1990s when 
China’s first group of independent nonprofit organizations 
emerged.  Well aware of their autonomous nature in contrast to 
the GONGOs, these organizations gradually perceived the 
meaning and importance of “grassroots.”  As the NGO activists 
started to call their entities “grassroots organizations,” reports 
on those organizations also began to use the term2. In their 
recent work, some Chinese scholars consider grassroots 
organizations to be bottom-up entities initiated and operated by 
                                                 
2 My interviews with many autonomous organizations in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s. The earliest reports using this term appeared in China 
Development Brief, a Kunming (later on Beijing) based weekly journal run 
by a US registered organization focusing on NGOs in China. 
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the people rather than the government (Xu Yushan, 2007; Xu 
Weihua 2007).  
In contrast to the popular Western use of GO to suggest the 
organization’s emergence as a “bottom up,” local phenomenon, 
most Chinese organizations that claim themselves to be 
grassroots are neither locally based nor using an associational 
form. In fact, most high-profile grassroots organizations in 
China are either urban elite-organized advocacy organizations 
or professional service providers. Their programs or services 
often aim at national involvement and address a much larger 
region –if not the entire nation– than their registered levels. 
These organizations believe they are grassroots because they 
operate independently and without government funding. Thus it 
becomes clear that for both practitioners and scholars in China 
the most important element of “grassroots” is autonomy, and 
they equate this term with autonomous NGOs. “Grassroots 
organization” becomes an identity or even ideology for 
independent organizations to distinguish themselves from 
organizations that are either established or sponsored by the 
government. Because the word “autonomous” was, and to some 
extent still is, a politically sensitive word, it is easy to 
understand why the word “grassroots” has supplanted 
“independent” or “autonomous”.  
We should also note that the label “grassroots organization” 
brings practical benefits. Under China’s official NGO policy, 
self-organized entities, regardless of their missions and forms, 
are not entitled to receive government funding. The Chinese 
business sector has not yet become a real resource for the 
nonprofit sector, let alone for grassroots organizations. Thus the 
entire or at least major portion of the grassroots organizations’ 
income derives from foreign donations, foundations, or NGOs.  
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Although many credentials or criteria are involved in granting 
funds to Chinese NGO,3 their autonomous nature is nonetheless 
an important factor. Increasingly, Chinese NGOs understand 
this condition in their applications for foreign private funds. 
Indeed, the financial incentive is an obvious motivation for 
Chinese organizations to highlight their “grassroots” nature. 
Uniquely, some types of organizations that may be grassroots 
organizations under other circumstance are not grassroots 
organizations in China.  For example, the workers’ unions or 
women’s associations at work units, communities, or villages 
are at the lowest level of their organizations, yet they are 
neither autonomous nor voluntary. Being the extended local 
“branches” of governmentally controlled national GONGOs 
such as the All-China Federation of Trade Unions and the All-
China Women’s Federation, these local organizations do not 
play the roles that GOs do. The neighborhood community 
committees (shequ jumin weiyuanhui 社区居民委员会 ) in 
urban China are another interesting example. Although for a 
decade the government has been promoting self-elected and 
self-governing neighborhood committees as the major goal in 
rebuilding urban communities, the committees newly elected 
by the residents in fact have served as the lowest tier of the 
government. Elected members of the committees are on the 
government payroll, and they carry certain administrative 
responsibilities as well. Only in 2007 did some cities start to lift 
the administrative duties allocated by the government from the 
committees to allow them to become autonomous and work for 
the so-called democratic process (Wu, 2007).   
Considering both the definition of the term “grassroots 
organization” worldwide and China’s specific practice, and 
                                                 
3 For an elaborate account on foreign aid to Chinese NGOs, see, Ma (2006). 
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especially bearing in mind the current development levels of 
Chinese NGOs, this study defines grassroots organizations in 
China as follows: All organizations –formally or informally 
formed, in associational form or otherwise, locally based or 
with national orientation, for public interests or self-interests–    
that are voluntarily and independently organized and operated 
by the members.   
There are reasons for offering such a broad definition. First of 
all, one of the major concerns behind distinguishing a 
grassroots category within the nonprofit sector is to address the 
importance of small local associations in responding to the 
domination of well-established, professionalized and 
institutionalized organizations. In China, the nongovernmental 
sector is still nascent, and concern over the undue influence of 
professionalized and institutionalized organizations on civil 
society is not an issue and probably will not be one for a long 
time. Secondly, China’s official NGO regulatory rules make 
establishing formal autonomous organizations very difficult.  
On the one hand, the grassroots organizations often do not meet 
the conditions required to become a legal, formal organization; 
on the other hand, community- or village-based organizations 
as well as university student organizations, among some others, 
do not need to register with the government and become formal. 
Thus the total number of legally formal grassroots 
organizations is proportionately small. Finally, as a later section 
of this paper will show, in recent years an enormous number of 
informally organized, unregistered, and unstable social groups 
and networks have emerged everywhere in China, including 
cyberspace. The majority of them exist locally, and they are 
engaging in a multitude of activities and missions. These 
entities have brought vitality to society and the 
nongovernmental sector and created an atmosphere of self-
expression and participation in the public sphere. The 
pervasiveness and depth of their actions have demonstrated in 
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so many ways the potential of the nongovernmental sector in 
general and grassroots organizations in particular.   
Categorizing Grassroots Organizations in China 
Based on the definition established above, this account 
considers the following organizations as grassroots, and based 
on their distinct initiative, missions, and organizational features 
it divides them into four categories: 1) well-organized 
associations that represent their members’ specific economic or 
social interests; 2) groups organized by urban elites that 
advocate for public interests; 3) informally and loosely 
organized social/cultural networks based in urban communities 
and rural villages; and 4) student organizations, especially 
voluntary ones, on university campuses. 
1). Special-interest Associations. Since the reforms, China’s 
economy and society have become increasingly diverse, with 
new economic and social forces emerging with resources and 
self-interests. Among the urban population, private 
entrepreneurs and the white-collar middle class are the most 
eager to promote and protect their specific interests, and 
inevitably they seek associational and collective actions. The 
most rapidly growing and noticeable interests-oriented 
independent organizations are 1) the privately organized trade 
associations and chambers of commerce that represent various 
trades; and 2) the self-organized real estate owners’ 
organizations in urban residential compounds. Following are 
some outstanding features of the A group.  
Using A group as example. Among 82.047 officially registered 
trade associations, the privately initiated chambers of 
commerce are a minority; however, they represent the country’s 
most vibrant and increasingly crucial economic force, and their 
political influence is growing rapidly. In coastal regions such as 
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Zhejiang and Fujian provinces, these organizations have started 
to play important roles in promoting and protecting their 
members’ interests (Ma, 2006). In the early 1990s, for example, 
to best advance their economic interests and stifle suicidal 
competition and numerous unlawful business practices, 
Wenzhou private entrepreneurs felt a strong need to establish 
chambers of commerce, and they pressed the local government 
for permission. This was a groundbreaking action, as China had 
not had private business associations since the 1950s. To a 
certain degree, this was the earliest collective negotiation 
between private entrepreneurs and the government since the 
economic reforms in the 1980s. By 2004, over 110 private 
chambers of commerce had emerged in this region of 7,15 
million people. Concurrently, about a hundred Wenzhou 
businessmen’s associations were established in cities across 
China to provide members with important services, offer 
protection against abuse by official powers and lawsuits, and 
lend assistance in communication among members and with the 
government (Chen and Zhou, 2002; Yu and Xiao, 2004).  
An obvious strength and advantage of private business 
associations is their financial resources. Due to the official 
government policy of not funding private organizations, most 
Chinese independent NGOs face serious revenue shortages, and 
many of them depend heavily if not totally on international 
support. In contrast, the private entrepreneurs are the most 
resourceful and self-motivated socioeconomic group in China, 
and the private chambers of commerce are financially 
independent and self-sufficient. Financial resources allow a 
great degree of freedom in decision-making and governance as 
well as a potential influence on policy-making. Although 
currently the great majority of these business associations are 
keeping in line with the official policies, independent voices are 
emerging.  In recent years, for example, the associations of real 
estate business people have voiced loudly and clearly their 
10 Ma Qiusha 
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opinions on the government’s housing and urban development 
policy, and some of their actions directly or indirectly 
challenged official housing policy.4   
One rather dramatic action by the real estate associations 
represents an inevitable political consequence of the growth of 
the private economy and business associations. The episode 
occurred when the real estate associations expressed strong 
concern about the government’s new housing policy. In an 
attempt to control overheated housing prices, in March 2005 
the State Council issued its famous eight-point house 
construction policy (guobadian 国八点 ). Not long after its 
release, Ren Zhiqiang, the chair of Real Estate Chambers of 
Commerce and the CEO of a high-profile Beijing real estate 
company, wrote a long article that challenged the official 
estimation of China’s urban housing market and strongly 
criticized the government’s interference in the housing market. 
The article was in the name of the Chamber of Commerce and 
was delivered to the relevant government agency; very soon, it 
appeared online and was publicized widely among other media. 
This so-called “Ren’s ten-thousand-words statement” 
(wanyanshu 万言书 ) provoked a heated debate among the 
public over the government’s new policy (Ren, 2005).  
Around the same time, Hu Baosin, the president of the 
Federation of China Cities (Zhongcheng Liangmeng中城联盟
), the biggest private association in the housing business, 
published an “open letter” (gongkai xin 公开信) expressing his 
opinion of the new policy (Ren, 2005). On other occasions Hu 
had stated clearly that “the mission of Zhongcheng Liangmeng 
                                                 
4 Interview Ren Zhiqiang, CEO of Huayuan Company and one of the most 
outspoken businessmen, Beijing, 2005. Interviews with Wang Haoli and 
Huang Jisu, senior editors of China Social Science, 2005. 
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was to influence the policy-making of housing business 
regulations and seek the maximum interests of its members”. 
According to China’s political vocabulary, the terms “open 
letter” and “ten-thousand-words statement” convey a strong 
political challenge, and consequently both Ren’s and Hu’s 
voices influenced public opinion and even official policy. To 
certain degree, they indeed accomplished their goal.5 
2). Urban public-interest organizations. Residents of large cities 
have initiated autonomous organizations to support public 
interests such as the environment, education, human rights, 
public health, and poverty alleviation. In their operational 
orientation, they favor advocacy, research, or service. A 
noticeable feature of the leadership of these organizations is 
that they are overwhelmingly urban elites.  In current Chinese 
political culture, urban elites include political elites, intellectual 
elites, and economic elites, and, among them, the intellectuals 
have been the first and most active in promoting 
nongovernmental organizations for public interests. For 
example, the first group of environmental NGOs was 
established by Liang Congjie (retired history professor at 
Beijing University, founder of Friends of Nature), Liao Xiaoyi 
(master’s degree from an American university, founder of 
Global Village Beijing), Wang Yongchen (journalist, founder 
of Green Home), and Xu Jianchu (Ph.D. in environmental 
management, founder of Center for Bio-diversity and 
Indigenous Knowledge). Likewise, in the forefront of the fight 
against AIDS, Wan Yanhai, the founder of a renowned NGO 
for AIDS education, graduated from the prestigious Fudan 
University Medical School with an M.D. in public health; and 
Zhang Konglai, founder of the China AIDS Network, is a 
senior doctor and researcher in China’s best medical institution: 
                                                 
5 Interview with Ren Zhiqiang, 2005, and Wang Haoli and Huang Jisu, 2005. 
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Beijing Union Medical University. This list can go on, and one 
can also see intellectual leadership in grassroots organizations 
in the fields of women’s rights, rural poverty alleviation, 
education, and many others.      
It is not a coincidence that intellectuals have played such an 
important role in China’s NGO development. China’s deep-
rooted tradition of intellectuals’ social responsibility no doubt 
is a continuing moral value for many intellectuals, old 
generation or young. Yet, there is a particular reason that these 
individuals chose the NGO as the institutional form for their 
causes. As many of them recalled later, the knowledge of NGO 
theory and practice they obtained via different channels 
inspired them to organize their own NGOs.6 Because of their 
educational background, foreign language skills, study or 
conference opportunities abroad, and their connections with the 
outside world, the intellectuals, more so than any other social or 
political group in China, were in the best position to reach out 
and seek support from international NGOs.  
While intellectuals are pioneers in China’s NGOs, economic 
elites have begun to turn to NGOs to advance public causes. 
Slowly and on a small scale, some business people have started 
to take part in social development initiatives. 7  Most such 
                                                 
6 In my interviews with many NGO leaders, it has been the case almost 
without exception. For similar expressions, also see, Li Xiaojiang ed.《身临
“ 奇 境 ” 》 (Being in the wonderland), Nanjing: Jiangsu People’s 
Publishing House, 2000. 
7 The complaints about rich people in China are that they do not accept their 
social responsibility, nor do they return what they have received from 
society, see, “害怕露富，中美人均捐款相差 7300倍” (Fear of uncovering 
their fortune, there is 7.300 times of difference in donation per capita 
between Chinese and Americans) 东方日报，March 10, 2006.   
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actions take the form of monetary donations to education and 
poverty alleviation, and yet the launching of China’s first 
private entrepreneurs’ environmental NGO –SEE– represented 
a new effort by business people towards direct involvement in 
public causes. The Society Entrepreneurs & Ecology (SEE, also 
called Alasan 阿拉善) was established by a hundred business 
men and women, most of them well-known in the mainland or 
Taiwan. Each pledged to donate ￥100,000 a year for the next 
ten years to fight the devastating expansion of the desert in 
Alasan, Inner Mongolia, one of the origins of dust storms.8 The 
creation of SEE gives hope for further involvement by private 
economic forces in the development of the nonprofit sector in 
China. Can China’s domestic private resources become an 
important, if not major, income source for the nonprofit sector? 
Two considerations make this question inevitably urgent. First, 
the Chinese government in general does not fund independent 
NGOs, and, second, international funding may be withdrawn 
from China as the country’s economy continues to grow rapidly. 
The most significant result of the direct participation of 
business people in public causes, however, is the political rather 
than monetary contribution to the evolution of civil society. 
The assumption of social responsibility enables them to pursue 
their vision and exert influence on social reforms and the 
government’s social policy-making. 
The urban elite organizations are the most representative civil 
society organizations in China. Their nature and operation 
reflect major features of an NGO as it is popularly conceived 
worldwide. Small in number and scale, especially in 
comparison with China’s vast population and mounting needs, 
                                                 
8 Interview with Yang Ping, the Secretary General of Society Entrepreneur 
& Ecology, 2005. 
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these organizations nevertheless have played a much larger role 
than their size and resources might suggest. They have had a 
significant effect on China’s ongoing reforms, and their actions 
have inspired many to follow. In numerous fronts in the fight 
for social justice and improving human lives, these 
organizations have often been the first to uncover problems, 
initiate action, and run programs.  Some nongovernmental think 
tanks and research institutes have become independent voices 
on reform policy and social issues, and they have earned the 
trust of the general public and even some decision-makers for 
their objective studies and professional ethics.9These operations 
have brought citizen participation, people’s initiatives, non-
governmental approaches, and a volunteer spirit into China’s 
public life. They have shown the Chinese public what NGOs 
are and what they can accomplish, and thus they are seen by 
many as the social and moral conscience in a material-driven 
China.  
Although the great majority of these organizations are formally 
established and well qualified as nonprofit organizations, many 
of them cannot legally register as nonprofit organizations in 
China. None of these autonomous organizations have become 
national organizations registered with the Ministry of Civil 
Affairs, and very few are registered at the provincial or 
municipal level. Most of these grassroots organizations have 
either registered at the county level even though their activities 
are nationwide or as the second-tier organizations (erji shetuan
二级社团) that do not carry corporative status.10  In order to 
register so they can operate legally, quite a few NGOs have had 
                                                 
9 Interview of Mao Yushi, one of the founders of Tian Ze, a high reputable 
independent economic research institute, 2005. 
10 The Chinese government registers the civil society organizations at three 
levels: national, provincial/ municipal, and district. 
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to register with bureaus of industry and commerce as for-profit 
firms. Since the 2005 tightening of control over independent 
NGOs, even this door is now closing. 
Understandably, under China’s political situation, most NGOs, 
including elite NGOs, adopt a non-confrontational stance 
towards the government and official policy. The foremost 
priority of these organizations is to survive the political system 
so that they can carry out their missions.11 This group of NGO 
leaders, activists and scholars alike, is well-educated and 
possesses sufficient understanding of China’s political reality as 
well as the concepts of Western civil society.  Unlike their 
counterparts in Western countries, many of these leaders do not 
see the role of Chinese NGOs as a safeguard against state 
interference in the private sector. 12 Moreover, for the 
organizations’ and their own sake, they do not want to confront 
the state. Rather, they are willing to compromise both their 
ideas and programs if circumstances force them to do so.  
The landscapes of Chinese NGOs and their leaderships have 
become increasingly diverse and complex, not only in 
organizational structure and mission but also in the motivations 
moving people to join NGOs. For many young people, running 
an NGO has become a new career option or even a business 
possibility. Well-educated people invest their time, expertise, 
and career prospects in the NGO field just as they do in the 
business world. Naturally they would like to stay in a 
politically “comfortable zone” and make a “comfortable life”. 
Thus, mainstream, elite NGOs are primarily practical and 
pragmatic, and they are concerned foremost about the survival 
                                                 
11 Interviews with NGO leaders, 1996-2005. 
12 For Chinese scholars’ arguments on this subject, see, Ma (2006), chapter 
1. 
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of their organizations rather than any ideological issues 
involving NGO autonomy.  
3). Loosely organized community and village groups. A vast 
and fluid flock of grassroots groups has emerged in urban 
communities and rural villages. They evince a wide array of 
purposes, organizational forms and conditions, operations, and 
financial conditions, from increasingly popular self-developing 
hobby and exercise groups in parks to Internet bulletin board 
systems (BBS) groups (over 100.000 in 2004) (Wang and He, 
2004). Hardly any of these groups are registered with the civil 
affairs bureaus. In the 1980s, hobby clubs flourished in many 
cities, but in the 1990s the government shut down many while 
placing others under the bureaus of sports or culture (Wang and 
Sun, 2002). Nevertheless, many more have resurfaced since the 
late 1990s. Just in Beijing, for example, over 200 singing 
chorales and a similar number of Beijing Opera fan clubs meet 
regularly and have their own budgets and paid rehearsal 
places.13 A large number of people participate in these activities 
faithfully, and their informal groups are open to everyone and 
yet are quite well-organized. With the agreement of the 
participants, the groups usually collect fees to pay for 
teachers/organizers or equipment.  
Another example is the super-female-vocal (chaoji nüsheng超
级女声 or chaonü超女) competitions organized by Hunan TV 
in the summer of 2005. The competition’s slogan, “if you like 
to sing, you sing” (xiang chang jiu chang 想唱就唱), inspired 
countless young girls; its “everyone can become a star” 
message became the huge attraction of the show. Fans 
organized themselves into groups to follow the competitions 
                                                 
13 Interviews with participants of these cultural groups, 2002, 2004, 2005. 
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from one city to another and promote their stars. In the 
estimation of the event organizer, several million people voted 
via cell phones for their favorite performers. Undoubtedly, the 
call-in was a great boon to the TV station (at ¥1.00 per cell 
phone vote), yet it also provided a meaningful experience for 
both the competition’s participants and the voters. For the great 
majority of the voters, this may have been the first time that 
their votes counted. Most interestingly, this so-called “chaonü 
phenomenon” led to a heated debate among intellectuals over 
whether the event could be seen as a sign of increasing citizen 
participation and democracy in China. 14 While some 
passionately called this the “thumb democracy” (muzhi minzhu
拇指民主 , people use their thumbs to send the phone 
message), others ridiculed the intellectuals as desperate to 
detect any hint of democracy in China (Liu, 2005). 
Nonetheless, regarding people’s associational behavior, we 
cannot ignore the chaonü competition’s significance: people 
indeed organized themselves for their own purposes, and, 
thanks to modern technology, their actions quickly reached a 
large scale.   
Without question, the growth of these social networks has 
substantial social and political implications. It is significant that 
these groups are extensive and inclusive. Compared to formally 
established organizations with defined criteria for membership, 
anyone can join the informal groups and networks. They attract 
people across professional, residential, and financial boundaries, 
                                                 
14 Zeng Jun (2006), “思想与学术在当代文化中合流” (The confluence of 
ideology and scholarship in contemporary culture), 
www.chinesenewsnet.com (accessed in January 29). 
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and participation is truly voluntary.15 Such an inclusiveness or 
openness is particularly meaningful to those excluded from the 
formally established organizations usually organized along 
political or professional lines. Thus it is understandable why the 
growth of these types of informal associations has been so rapid; 
in fact, these social groups outnumber the registered 
organizations.16  
Many factors have contributed to the prosperity of informal 
gatherings and networks. Consequently, these associations have 
profoundly changed social behavior. People now are able to 
control their private time, space, and resources, and to various 
degrees they exercise their freedom of association and 
expression (Wang, 1995). Meanwhile, official control over 
public spaces and private lives has relaxed considerably. Non-
official and often non-commercial cultural, entertainment, and 
educational programs have offered the public alternative 
choices and opportunities. At the same time, the enormous need 
by low income or marginalized people for information and 
services has prompted others to organize non-commercial 
services or self/mutual help networks.17  
The rapid adoption of modern Technology –Internet, cell 
phones, and BP phones in particular– is another factor in the 
                                                 
15 Considering the fact that many so-called voluntary activities in China are 
officially organized, the voluntary nature of these gatherings is more 
meaningful.    
16  Interview with an official in the Bureau of Nongovernmental 
Organizations of the Ministry of Civil Affairs, 2004. 
17 Interviews with a self-help organization for returned “educated-youth” 
(zhishi qingnian) from the Great Northern Wilderness, and community 
service organizations in Beijing, Shenyang, and Shanghai. 1996, 2001, and 
2005.   
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development of informal social networks. Especially in cities 
and among young people, these technologies have become 
widespread and are essential to organizers who want to 
mobilize large-scale activities on short notice.18 The number of 
Internet users exploded from 1.600 in 1994 to 103 million in 
2005, as Web sites jumped from 1.500 in 1997 up to 677.500 in 
2005 (Cai, 2006). The accelerating growth of cyberspace and its 
uncontrollable nature make it an ideal place for nourishing 
China’s e-civil society. The energy, enthusiasm, and creativity 
of people determined to control and improve their own lives 
have broken free from long-time suppression, and indeed have 
become the dynamic force behind people’s self-organizing.    
4). University student organizations. Official regulations do not 
require campus student organizations to register, but approval 
and sponsorship from university authorities are necessary. 
Certain unique features distinguish this type of organization 
from others. For instance, unlike in other types of organization, 
members of student organizations are typically similar in age, 
education, residency, and daily engagements. Such similarities 
no doubt provide an advantage in organizing activities and 
achieving a high participation rate. Since the turn of the 20th 
century, China’s universities have served as the cradle for all 
kinds of political and reform movements. This tradition has 
inspired generation after generation of students to devote 
themselves to political and social movements and organized 
actions. Because of this, a succession of governments, 
especially the Communist government, has always kept a close 
watch on university organizations. The continual change in 
student populations leads to a fluidity in the nature of campus 
organizations; membership turnover is high and changes in 
both leadership and mission are frequent.  
                                                 
18 Interviews with Chinese scholars on NGOs, 2005. 
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The majority of student groups focus on academic interests and 
campus lives, so their activities and influence are basically 
restrained within the campus. Participation rates are generally 
high, and very few students do not participate in some sort of 
student organization. A prestigious university in Beijing can 
serve as an example. This university has around 8.000 
undergraduate students and a similar number of graduate 
students. It has over seventy formally established student 
organizations registered with the university, with over 2.500 
members. At the same time, additional organizations exist at 
school and departmental levels. The school’s annual budget for 
all kinds of student organizations is ¥ 500.000, and the average 
grant for each organization is ¥500. Obtaining sponsors and 
approval is not difficult as long as the organization’s mission 
does not conflict with the official political ideology. The 
organizations are self-run, but the university employs seven 
full-time and twelve half-time staff as supervisors. Most of the 
leaders of such organizations are members of either the 
Communist Party or China’s Youth League.19  
Since the 1989 Tian’anmen student movements, the 
government and university authorities have been highly alert to 
campus gatherings. They keep a short leash on student campus 
activities and do not hesitate to crush any organizations or 
activities that fall out of line with the Communist Party. 20 At 
the same time, the strong influence of current commercial 
trends in Chinese culture since 1989 has drawn students’ 
interests away from political issues and democracy. Thus, to a 
large degree, the political salons or forums that once were so 
                                                 
19 Interview with the director of the Student Organizations Office of that 
university, 2005, Beijing.  
20 Intervews with students at Beijing University, 2001. 
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popular on campuses in the late 1980s have lost their attraction.  
In contrast with the stagnation of political organizations, in 
recent years the number of student voluntary organizations 
engaging in environmental protection, rural education, poverty 
alleviation, and AIDS/HIV prevention has increased 
impressively. For example, there were only eight student 
environmental groups in 1995. The number started to climb in 
1999. By 2001, most major universities had environmental 
organizations with at least 184 college environmental 
associations operating in China (Yang, 2005). “Environmental 
protection gives college students a legitimate reason to organize 
activities beyond academic matters and campus walls” (Ma, 
2006). The experience of volunteer work and organizing 
grassroots NGOs has had a lasting impact on these participants 
even after their graduation. I interviewed a mainstay leader of 
the Center for Biodiversity and Indigenous Knowledge (CBIK), 
a well-known grassroots NGO in Yunnan Province. When she 
was a student, Ms. Wang was an organizer of an environmental 
organization at Yunnan University, and this experience led her 
to CBIK and the environmental cause. 21  In short, these 
organizations provide students with opportunities not only to 
understand problems in real society but also to help solve those 
problems. 
Grassroots Organizations and Social Capital 
Deeply impressed by how democratic governance in the United 
States differed strikingly from the centralized French state, 
Alexander de Tocqueville in his Democracy in America (1835, 
1840) came to see associations as performing several key 
functions: answering unmet social needs, mediating between 
personal or local interests and the national common good, 
                                                 
21 Interviews with Wang Yu, 2002, 2004, Kunming. 
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preventing the tyranny of the majority, limiting state power, 
and preventing abuse by the state (Alagappa, 2004). To neo-
Tocquevilleans, healthy associational life is crucial to civil 
society and democracy. Robert Putnam has rejuvenated the 
concept of social capital and articulated such a relationship 
explicitly. According to Putnam, a dense and elaborate network 
of voluntary or informal organizations generates social capital 
by promoting social trust, norms of reciprocity, networks of 
civic engagement, and successful cooperation (Putnam, 1993). 
Putnam argues that  
“networks of civic engagement, like the neighborhood 
associations, choral societies, cooperatives, sports clubs, 
mass-based parties, and the like…, represent intense 
horizontal interaction. Networks of civic engagement are an 
essential form of social capital: The denser such networks in 
a community, the more likely that its citizens will be able to 
cooperate for mutual benefit” (Putnam, 1993).  
Based on this conviction, his controversial conclusion: 
“American social capital in the form of civic associations has 
significantly eroded over the last generation” (Putnam, 1995), 
represents Putnam’s deep concern for the future of democracy.   
Following Putnam’s definition, Kenneth Newton highlights 
three important facets of the concept of social capital.  First, he 
argues that with reciprocity and trust, social capital can turn 
individuals “with little social conscience and little sense of 
social obligation into members of a community with shared 
interests, shared assumptions about social relations and a sense 
of common good”. Thus, it becomes the social cement that 
binds society together. Second, the main features of social 
capital can be found in formal or informal networks, “which 
link friends, family, community, work, and both public and 
private life.” Last, the function of social capital is productive 
and can be defined in terms of “collective goods, facilities, and 
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services which are produced in the voluntary sector, as opposed 
to being produced by families, markets, or government” 
(Newton, 1999). As later sections will illustrate, these features 
all appear in China’s recent associational revolution.  
It is true that many associations are motivated by self-interest; 
nonetheless, as some scholars point out, they bring a positive 
influence to society. Nan Lin argues that “institutionalized 
social relations with embedded resources are expected to 
benefit both the collective and the individuals in the collective” 
(Lin, 2001). According to Putnam, “One special feature of 
social capital, like trust, norms, and networks, is that it is 
ordinarily a public good”. He points out that though often a 
byproduct of other social activities, social capital helps to 
overcome dilemmas of collective action by inducing reciprocity 
and social networks, thereby creating opportunities for new 
action (Putnam, 1993). Thus, associational life breeds trust, 
cooperation, and self-discipline; in turn, civic engagement 
stimulates political involvement, citizenry, and general interest 
in the public good. In their study of American civil 
volunteerism, Sidney Verba, Kay Schlozman, and Henry Brady 
argue that “both the motivation and the capacity to take part in 
politics have their roots in the fundamental non-political 
institutions” (Berba, et al, 1995). Coming full circle, Putnam 
underscores the value of social capital to democracy when he 
concludes that, “social capital, as embodied in horizontal 
networks of civic engagement, bolsters the performance of the 
polity and the economy, rather than the reverse: strong society, 
strong economy; strong society, strong state” (Putnam, 1993).  
Thus, participating in social networks, formal or informal, 
increases people’s social capital and ultimately benefits society 
and promotes a democratic system. Is this theory applicable to 
China’s case? Theoretically it is very difficult to establish a 
quantitative analysis of how associational life increases the 
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Chinese people’s social capital. Nonetheless, case studies on 
grassroots organizations show positive signs for such an 
assumption. From my interviews of participants in social 
networks/organizations, it becomes clear that people gain self-
confidence, self-esteem, sociability, civility, and citizen 
responsibility in civic engagements. People initiate or join in 
associations or collective activities either for personal reasons  
–such as to make friends, gather information, or develop a 
personal hobby– or for public causes. In either case, 
organization and governance are keys to achieving their goals. 
To a large degree, a healthy grassroots organization requires 
that everyone become involved in making decisions and 
running activities.  
For example, a women’s singing group of 30 regular members 
in Beijing elects a treasury committee, skill-training committee, 
and membership committee to run practices, rehearsals and 
performances. The committee members learn to lead, while 
others learn to respect the elected committees and cooperate 
with the leaders and peers.22 A meaningful point here is that all 
these activities rely on voluntary participation. One Beijing 
Opera Fan Club member told me her story of how the club 
helped her fulfill her childhood dream and how it made her 
happy and proud of herself as never before.23 Another example 
concerns a neighborhood senior center in Ningbo, Zhejiang 
province. When some retired residents decided to organize this 
center to enrich their lives, they had to learn many skills that 
they had never attempted before. With help from the Can Yu 
Shi Community Development Center, a Beijing-based 
grassroots NGO, these seniors finally got all they needed: a 
                                                 
22 Interview with a member of this singing group, 2005. 
23 Interview with this woman, 2004. 
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large room, some furniture and facilities, and a charter. Friction 
and minor conflict among the members arose over what to do 
and how to do it, understandably; yet, they eventually learned 
how to interact well with each other. The following anecdote is 
an interesting example of how they run the center. During the 
hot summer, the members decided to buy an air conditioner, a 
major investment by the center. Not only did they successfully 
raise enough money, but to avoid spending too much on 
electricity, they also established rules, which everyone followed, 
on when to turn on the AC and who takes responsibility.24  
Under China’s current political and social culture, AIDS/HIV 
victims, drug abusers, and the homosexual population live on 
the periphery of society and suffer from blatant discrimination. 
They could not –and the great majority of them still cannot–
find adequate medical treatment. My interviewees told me their 
tragic experiences in struggling for dignity, self-esteem, family 
love, and hope. Job discrimination, family abandonment, and 
social prejudice have pushed many of them toward suicide.  
The sudden surge of an impressive number of centers, hotlines, 
drug rehabilitation clinics, magazines and various educational 
and social networks for these populations indeed have created a 
certain degree of hope and real life. The entertainment 
organized by the centers for homosexuals provides educational 
and medical information about AIDS and drug abuse 
prevention. All these activities are organized and performed by 
the members. In return, this voluntary work instills the 
participants with pride and confidence.  These places can 
                                                 
24 Interview with Song Qinghua, the director of this Center, 2005. 
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become a sort of home, in some cases the only social place the 
members have.25    
These stories echo Putnam’s assertion that networks of civic 
engagement foster sturdy norms of generalized reciprocity and 
encourage the emergence of social trust. Such networks 
facilitate coordination and communication, amplify reputations, 
and thus allow dilemmas of collective action to be resolved 
(Putnam, 1995). In civic engagements, members of grassroots 
groups deal with “insignificant” matters daily, and yet these 
activities carry significant meanings for them. In China, the 
freedom of association had been absent for several decades 
since 1949, and ordinary people, especially those marginalized 
by political and economic conditions, did not have a chance to 
take part in decision-making on public or collective matters. 
Launching their own organizations or networks, raising funds 
and making decisions are exciting and challenging, giving 
people self-confidence and a sense of responsibility to their 
members and to society as a whole. In my interviews, I saw 
firsthand how these engagements have changed participants’ 
lives. It is true that not every organization succeeded. Indeed, 
the successful ones have coped with many difficulties, and 
many organizations failed to survive for all kinds of reasons. 
Nevertheless, people learned from both successful and failed 
experiences.   
In summary, regardless of the shifts in official NGO policies 
between loosening or tightening government control, the last 
decade has witnessed the substantial progress of grassroots 
organizations. The upsurge of grassroots organizations is the 
direct outcome of a pluralistic economy and diversified society. 
                                                 
25 My interviews with AIDS/HIV patients, homosexuals, and drug abusers in 
Kunming and Beijing, 2007.  
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The uneven yet steady growth of grassroots organizations in 
various categories indicates that civic association and social 
networking have become meaningful mechanisms for Chinese 
of various social backgrounds and for various purposes. The 
widespread emergence and progressive actions of grassroots 
organizations have become an important factor in China’s 
social and political transformation, and it gives us hope for a 
stronger civil society in China. 
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